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Non-technical summary
In this study we analyze to what extent unemployment persistence may be explained
by stigmatization effects. It is a well-established finding that individuals who are unemployed
in one period are more likely to be unemployed in future periods. On the one hand, high
unemployment risks may be due to individual characteristics such as low qualification, a
low level of motivation or a general lack of abilities. To the extent that such characteristics
persist over time, they will also increase the unemployment risk of future periods, creating a
spurious relationship between current and future unemployment. On the other hand, there
is the alternative possibility that the unemployment experience of one period has a genuine
causal effect on the unemployment risk of future periods in the sense that past unemployment
causally increases the unemployment risk of future periods independently of other factors
(this is usually called state dependence or true state dependence). In the empirical literature
there is ample evidence for state dependence in individual unemployment histories but little
is known about its sources. Possible explanations are disincentive effects of unemployment
insurance, discouragement effects or decay of human capital. In this paper we analyze another
possibility, namely the existence of stigma effects, meaning that individuals who are or who
have been unemployed face systematically lower chances of being hired because employers
interpret their unemployment as a negative signal.
The hypothesis underlying our empirical approach is that the stigma of unemployment
is low when aggregate unemployment is high, as in this case, individual unemployment is
not a strong signal for lower individual productivity. We use data from the German Socio-
Economic Panel (GSOEP) to estimate the probability of being unemployed conditional on
the employment state of the previous period (the state dependence effect) and other cova-
riates using a dynamic, correlated random effects model.
Our results show that positive deviations of the unemployment rate from its trend are
indeed associated with a significantly lower level of state dependence. Overall, we conclu-
de that stigmatization is one explanation for state dependence in individual’s employment
histories and thus contributes to the explanation of high and persistent rates of long-term
unemployment in Germany.
Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze
In dieser Studie analysieren wir, ob Stigmatisierungseffekte ein Grund fu¨r die Persistenz
von Arbeitslosigkeit sind. Es ist allgemein bekannt, dass Personen, die in einer Periode ar-
beitslos sind, dies auch mit ho¨herer Wahrscheinlichkeit in zuku¨nftigen Perioden sind. Gru¨nde
fu¨r hohe Arbeitslosigkeitsrisiken in einer Periode ko¨nnen niedrige Qualifikation, geringe Mo-
tivation oder eine insgesamt niedrige Produktivita¨t sein. In dem Maße wie diese perso¨nlichen
Eigenschaften u¨ber die Zeit persistent sind, erho¨hen sie auch das Risiko zuku¨nftiger Arbeits-
losigkeit und erzeugen damit einen scheinbaren Zusammenhang zwischen gegenwa¨rtiger und
zuku¨nftiger Arbeitslosigkeit. Ein alternativer Erkla¨rungsansatz fu¨r diesen Zusammenhang ist
die sog. Zustandsabha¨ngigkeit. In diesem Fall erho¨ht gegenwa¨rtige Arbeitslosigkeit kausal das
Risiko zuku¨nftiger Arbeitslosigkeit, unabha¨ngig von anderen Faktoren. In der empirischen
Literatur findet man umfassende Evidenz fu¨r die Existenz von Zustandsabha¨ngigkeit, aber
wenig Hinweise auf deren Quellen. Mo¨gliche Gru¨nde sind Anreizprobleme der Arbeitslo-
senversicherung, Entmutigungseffekte von Arbeitslosigkeit oder der durch Arbeitslosigkeit
verursachte Verlust von Humankapital. In dieser Studie wird ein weiterer mo¨glicher Grund
untersucht, na¨mlich die Existenz von Stigmatisierungseffekten. Stigmatisierung tritt dann
auf, wenn Arbeitslose systematisch geringere Chancen auf eine Bescha¨ftigung haben, weil
Arbeitgeber ihre Arbeitslosigkeit als negatives Signal werten.
Unserem Ansatz liegt die Hypothese zugrunde, dass in Zeiten, in denen die gesamt-
wirtschaftliche Arbeitslosenquote vergleichsweise hoch ist, Stigmatisierungseffekte niedriger
ausfallen sollten, da alle Personen sta¨rker von Arbeitslosigkeit betroffen sind und damit die
Signalwirkung individueller Arbeitslosigkeit im Hinblick auf die individuelle Produktivita¨t
geringer ist. Wir nutzen Daten des Sozioo¨konomischen Panel Deutschland (SOEP) um das
Arbeitslosigkeitsrisiko einer gegebenen Periode in Abha¨ngigkeit des Erwerbszustands der
vergangenen Periode und in Abha¨ngigkeit weiterer erkla¨render Variablen zu scha¨tzen. Wir
verwenden hierzu ein dynamisches, korreliertes Random Effects Modell.
Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass eine negative Trendabweichung der aktuellen Arbeitslo-
senrate tatsa¨chlich mit signifikant geringerer Zustandsabha¨ngigkeit verbunden ist. Insgesamt
bedeutet dies, dass Stigmatisierung ein Grund fu¨r die Zustandsabha¨ngigkeit in individuellen
Erwerbsbiografien sein kann und damit einen Beitrag zur Erkla¨rung der hohen und persis-
tenten Langzeitarbeitslosigkeit in Deutschland leistet.
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1 Introduction
It is a well-established finding that individuals who are unemployed in one period are more
likely to be unemployed in future periods. Such a relationship may be due to two fundamen-
tally different mechanisms (see Heckman (1981)). First, it may be the case that individuals
who are unemployed in one period are so because they have characteristics that make them
particularly vulnerable to unemployment. This might be observed characteristics such as low
qualifications or a lack of work experience, or typically unobserved factors such as low levels
of motivation, unfavorable attitudes or a general lack of abilities. To the extent that such cha-
racteristics persist over time, they will also increase the unemployment risk of future periods,
creating a spurious relationship between current and future unemployment. The alternative
possibility is that the unemployment experience of one period has a genuine causal effect
on the unemployment risk of future periods in the sense that past unemployment causally
increases the unemployment risk of future periods (this is usually called state dependence
or true state dependence).
While there is ample evidence for state dependence effects in individual unemployment
histories (see e.g. Flaig et al. (1993), Mu¨hleisen and Zimmermann (1994), Arulampalam et al.
(2000), Gregg (2001), Arulampalam (2002), Knights et al. (2002), and Ha¨ma¨la¨inen (2003)),
little is known about the possible sources of them. In principle, different mechanisms may
give rise to a genuine causal effect of past to future unemployment. A possible explanati-
on are disincentive effects of unemployment insurance, which may lead the unemployed to
postpone accepting job offers. Such effects may be easily rationalized in standard job search
models (see e.g. Mortensen (1977) and Burdett (1979)). A similar mechanism is at work
when unemployment experiences are associated with processes of discouragement or habi-
tuation, which may make the unemployed reduce their search efforts and therefore increase
the risk of remaining unemployed (Georgellis et al. (2001)). Another possibility is that un-
employment leads to a decay of human capital, making it more difficult to find employment
in future periods (Mincer and Polachek (1974), Pissarides (1992)). Finally, and this is the
focus of this paper, there is the possibility of stigma effects, meaning that individuals who
are unemployed face systematically lower chances of being hired because employers interpret
their unemployment as a negative signal. This will make individuals who are unemployed
more likely to stay unemployed, and individuals who were unemployed more likely to become
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unemployed again.
There are a number of theoretical contributions that explain how stigmatization effects
may arise. For example, Vishwanath (1989) argues in a job search model that an employer’s
expectation that an applicant has high productivity declines with the number of previously
observed unsuccessful matches of the person. Bikhchandani et al. (1992) and Ku¨bler and
Weizsa¨cker (2003) show that, if high productivity workers are more likely to send positive
signals than low productivity workers (e.g. in job interviews or aptitude tests) it may beco-
me optimal for employers to invest less effort in observing the applicant’s productivity on
their own in favor of relying on the sequence of previously observed signals (or their results
in the form of successful or unsuccessful matches in previous periods). This gives rise to
informational cascades with the result that workers who were successful in the early stages
of their career will remain so, and workers who were not successful will find it hard to over-
come their past record, i.e. they become stigmatized. Most relevant to the present paper,
Lockwood (1991) presents a model of labor market flows in which firms imperfectly test wor-
kers prior to hiring them. As high productivity workers find it easier to pass the test, they
tend to exit unemployment faster than low productivity workers. This gives informational
content about workers’ productivity to elapsed job search durations. Lockwood then shows
that it is optimal for employers to condition on this observable information by rejecting for
sure those workers who have been searching for too long. Interestingly in Lockwood’s model,
employers will tolerate longer search durations when general unemployment is high and will
be stricter when general unemployment is low. This is in line with the intuition that it looks
more suspicious if a person is unemployed when conditions are generally well compared to
the case where unemployment and long search durations are relatively common.
There are a few contributions that address stigmatization effects empirically. A di-
rect approach to investigating stigma effects is adopted by Blau and Robins (1990) and
Oberholzer-Gee (2007). Comparing job search outcomes for employed and unemployed wor-
kers, Blau and Robins (1990) observe that the actual job offer rate per application is greater
for employed searchers than for unemployed searchers. In a field experiment, Oberholzer-Gee
(2007) experimentally varies unemployment durations stated in the CVs of two administrati-
ve assistants who were looking for a job. His results indeed suggest that employers are much
less inclined to invite applicants to job interviews if their CV states they are unemployed
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or even long-term unemployed. Looking at possible stigmatization effects more indirectly,
Gibbons and Katz (1991) compare wages and employment outcomes of workers displaced by
lay-offs and workers displaced by plant closings. They find weak evidence for stigma effects,
as in certain cases laid-off workers suffer higher wage losses and longer unemployment spells
than workers affected by plant closings (controlling for other characteristics). They argue
that in lay-offs, low productivity workers are displaced first so that markets infer that laid-
off workers are of low ability. Most closely related to the present paper, Omori (1997) argues
that, if stigma effects exist, the effect of past unemployment spells on the length of future
unemployment spells should depend on the circumstances under which past unemployment
occurred. If unemployment was high when the person lost her job then this should give less
rise to stigmatization than if it was high. Omori (1997) finds such effects for US data. Note
that in contrast to the result in Lockwood (1991), here the disadvantageous effect of past
unemployment is interacted with the level of past unemployment rather than with the level
of current unemployment.
Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) this paper adds to the
empirical evidence on stigma effects by exploring the implications of the hypotheses in Lock-
wood (1991) and Omori (1997) that, if stigma effects exist, the negative effects of previous
unemployment on current unemployment risk should be larger if (past or current) unemploy-
ment is low and smaller if it is high. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section
2 we describe our data. Section 3 gives details on our econometric setup, while section 4
discusses our empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
For our analysis we use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) for the years
1991 to 2004. The GSOEP is a representative, yearly panel study that was started in 1984
for West Germany and extended to East Germany after reunification in 1990.2 In order to
take advantage of the larger sample, we only use the years after 1991. We concentrate on
men because employment histories of German women are often interrupted by periods of
2For more information on the GSOEP, see Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2005).
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maternal leave or voluntary inactivity of which it is unclear how they should be treated in
the context of possible stigmatization effects. We also drop the self-employed, civil servants,
individuals under 26 and over 56 years (to avoid problems with full-time education and early
retirement), and individuals who work in agriculture, construction or tourism (to rule out
potential problems with seasonal unemployment). We also discard periods where our sample
members do not report either to be working or unemployed. Our final (unbalanced) sample
consists of 4415 individuals. Some descriptive statistics are given in table 1.
— Table 1 about here —
The dependent variable of our analysis is individual unemployment status (officially
registered unemployed, full-time employed otherwise). As explanatory variables of unem-
ployment risk in a given period we consider age, marital status, the number of children,
educational qualifications (university degree, high school and/or apprenticeship, or otherwi-
se), disability status, and whether the person has a non-EU nationality.3 We also include
a full set of year and region dummies (North, West, Middle, East, South of Germany, and
Berlin). In order to measure labor market cycles, we regress the unemployment rate of each
federal state on a linear time trend and interpret the residuals from these regressions as
a measure of cyclical unemployment risk. Graphical inspection shows that this works well,
revealing clear cycles in each federal state (not necessarily synchronized across states), see
the figures A1 and A2 in the appendix. Note that differences in the level of unemployment
over time and across regions will be picked up by the year and region dummies.
3Similarly to the data used in Gibbons and Katz (1991), our data set also includes information on the
reasons for unemployment. However, none of these reasons proved significant when included as regressors in
our econometric model. This is in line with the results in Grund (1999) who also found no effects of these
reasons when investigating stigma effects of unemployment on future wages using the same data set. It is
unclear whether these results are due to small sample sizes or whether they reflect true relationships.
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3 Econometric model
Following earlier contributions cited above, we use a dynamic binary choice model to model
the evolution of individual unemployment status over time.4 Our main model is a dynamic,
correlated random-effects probit model in the form popularized by Wooldridge (2002, 2005).
In our case, the model takes the form
yit = 1 {θ1yit−1 + θ2utyit−1 + θ3xit + ci + eit} (1)
where
ci = α0 + α1yi0 + α2x¯i + ai, ai ∼ N(0, σ2a), eit ∼ N(0, 1). (2)
Here, yit denotes unemployment status of individual i in period t (=1 if the individual is
unemployed, =0 otherwise), yit−1 is the unemployment status of the previous period, and
utyit−1 is the interaction of past unemployment status and the measure of cyclical unemploy-
ment risk in period t. The vector xit collects the observed characteristics described above
and ci, eit are time-invariant and time-variant unobserved determinants of unemployment
risk in period t. As eq. (2) shows, the time-invariant unobserved component ci is allowed to
be correlated with the unemployment status of the initial period and the time-average of the
vector of explanatory variables (to address the initial conditions problem and the possible
endogeneity of explanatory variables with respect to time-invariant characteristics).5
If θ1 > 0, there is a dynamic causal effect of unemployment in the previous period
on unemployment risk in the current period. Other things held constant, individuals who
were unemployed in the previous period are more likely to be unemployed in the current
period (this is the state dependence effect). As discussed above, this may be due to different
4Because of its yearly design and the relatively small number of periods, our data set is not well-suited for
duration analyses (see Biewen and Wilke (2005)). Moreover, it is well known that, because of the continuous
sorting process inherent in duration analyses, it is much harder to separate dependence of current unem-
ployment risk on past unemployment from unobserved heterogeneity in duration models than in dynamic
binary choice models.
5If the unemployment risk is not influenced by unobserved determinants the contribution of the panel-level
variance component to the total variance, i.e. the proportion ρ = σ2a/(σ
2
a + 1) should be zero.
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mechanisms such as disincentives of unemployment insurance, loss of skills and motivation,
or stigmatization. However, if the disadvantage from having been unemployed in the previous
period is larger in times of low unemployment and smaller in times of high unemployment
(i.e. θ2 < 0), this points to stigmatization effects, as disincentives of unemployment insurance
and loss of skills and motivation should be independent of the business cycle (if anything,
their effect should be pro-cyclical not counter-cyclical).
The rationale of stigmatization effects in the above framework is that employers in-
terpret past unemployment as a negative signal and do so especially when it is relatively
easy to find a job, i.e. when unemployment is low. Following Omori (1997) one could argue
however, that it is not the current level of unemployment that matters, but the level of un-
employment measured at the time when past unemployment occurred. The argument would
be that employers discount past unemployment if it was experienced in times of difficult
labor market conditions and consider it more negative if it was experienced when finding a
job was relatively easy. In order to test this hypothesis we also estimate
yit = 1 {θ1yit−1 + θ2ut−1yit−1 + θ3xit + ci + eit} (3)
(past unemployment status is interacted with past cyclical unemployment risk).
Given the discussion above, one might wonder whether it is adequate to control for un-
observed determinants of unemployment risk when investigating stigma effects. After all, the
idea behind stigmatization is that employers use observed information (past unemployment
status) to infer unobserved productivity characteristics. If reasons for past unemployment are
independent of individual behaviour, stigmatization may lead to inefficient outcomes on the
labor market. Of course, this still leaves plenty of room for the direct influence of unobserved
characteristics, e.g. individuals may loose their job due to a lack of skills, or persons with low
levels of motivation may have higher unemployment risks because their job search intensity
is lower.
4 Empirical results
Table 2 presents our empirical results. Controlling for observed and unobserved characteri-
stics, past unemployment increases current unemployment risk. This effect is large and highly
6
significant. However, as column (A) shows, the disadvantage from having been unemployed
in the previous period strongly depends on the current state of the labor market. Dependence
of unemployment risk on past unemployment status is much smaller in times of relatively
high unemployment and much higher when unemployment is relatively low. The variation
of this effect is sizable if one considers that the values for the cyclical unemployment rate
vary between about -2 and +3. It is also highly significant. This is consistent with stigma
effects as predicted by Lockwood (1991). On the other hand, if past unemployment status
is interacted with past unemployment risk as suggested by Omori (1997) (see column (B)),
there is no significant effect. This suggests that the amount of stigmatization is related to
the current risk of unemployment and that employers do not consider the specific circum-
stances of past unemployment spells. This result is also in line with the fact that we found
no significant effects of the reasons for past unemployment.
In the previous chapter we discussed the role of unobserved heterogeneity in the con-
text of stigma effects. With a ρ of almost 0.3 we observe a high share of unemployment
persistence that can be directly explained by unobserved individual characteristics. Whereas
unobserved heterogeneity seems to play an important role, some of the control variables
are not significant. For example, marital status, the number of children and health status
do not seem to influence employment probabilities in a statistically significant way. On the
other hand, we find a convex and statistically significant age pattern of unemployment risk
with a minimal risk at the age of thirty-six years. As expected, educational qualifications
significantly reduce the risk of experiencing unemployment in a given period, while being a
non-EU member increases it. In addition to the effects of cyclical unemployment, we find
significant year and region effects in both specifications.
— Table 2 about here —
5 Conclusion
Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, this paper considered individual unem-
ployment persistence and its relationship to the business cycle. We find a strong countercycli-
cal behaviour of unemployment persistence which begs for an explanation. The disadvantage
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from having been unemployed in the previous period is high when unemployment is relative-
ly low and low when unemployment is relatively high. This is consistent with the hypothesis
that employers see unemployment as a stigma and do so especially when the conditions to
find a job are relatively good. On the other hand, if unemployment is relatively high, the
stigma connected to it is lower because it is a more widespread phenomenon.
Our findings contribute to the discussion about the high share of long-term unemploy-
ment in Germany. The long-term unemployed are doubly disadvantaged, as in good times,
they face particular difficulties because of stigmatization, while in bad times, hiring rates
are lower anyway. Even highly productive workers may be affected by this mechanism. Our
results suggest that, given the high persistence of individual unemployment risk, labor mar-
ket policies should devote more attention to the prevention of long-term unemployment,
as long-term unemployment - through mechanisms such as stigmatization, human capital
decay, and demoralization - will have the tendency to become permanent unemployment.
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Tables
Table 1. Summary statistics (pooled sample)
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
unempl. status 0.034 0.181
unempl. status (t− 1) 0.031 0.175
age 40.404 8.390
married 0.750 0.433
children in hh 0.525 0.499
1993 0.070 0.255
1994 0.066 0.248
1995 0.065 0.247
1996 0.066 0.248
1997 0.063 0.244
1998 0.060 0.238
1999 0.064 0.245
2000 0.063 0.244
2001 0.104 0.305
2002 0.104 0.305
2003 0.109 0.312
2004 0.098 0.297
unempl. status in 1992 0.038 0.192
university degree 0.298 0.457
high sch./apprenticeship 0.575 0.494
disability 0.057 0.232
non-EU nationality 0.093 0.291
North 0.127 0.333
West 0.221 0.415
Middle 0.132 0.339
Berlin 0.036 0.186
East 0.196 0.397
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Table 2. Dynamic random-effects probit model for unemployment status
(standard errors in parentheses)
Variable (A) (B)
unempl. status (t− 1) ∗∗1.4403 (0.0686) ∗∗1.4048 (0.0678)
unempl. status (t− 1) ∗∗-0.1795 (0.0537)
× cyclical unempl. rate in t
unempl. status (t− 1) -0.0078 (0.0447)
× cyclical unempl. rate in t− 1
age ∗-0.1006 (0.0491) ∗-0.0986 (0.0490)
age squared ∗0.0014 (0.0005) ∗∗0.0014 (0.0005)
married -0.1452 (0.1302) -0.1434 (0.1302)
children in hh -0.0532 (0.0961) -0.0545 (0.0959)
1993 -0.1029 (0.1062) -0.1047 (0.1066)
1994 ∗∗-0.3222 (0.1192) ∗∗-0.3144 (0.1204)
1995 ∗∗-0.5261 (0.1279) ∗∗-0.5124 (0.1290)
1996 ∗∗-0.5107 (0.1338) ∗∗-0.4903 (0.1341)
1997 ∗∗-0.6432 (0.1568) ∗∗-0.6104 (0.1577)
1998 ∗∗-0.7354 (0.1515) ∗∗-0.7250 (0.1559)
1999 ∗∗-0.8291 (0.1524) ∗∗-0.8259 (0.156 )
2000 ∗∗-0.3727 (0.1397) ∗∗-0.3750 (0.1401)
2001 -0.1734 (0.1225) -0.1792 (0.1218)
2002 -0.1293 (0.1217) -0.1318 (0.1208)
2003 -0.0759 (0.1213) -0.0728 (0.1210)
2004 -0.1657 (0.1312) -0.1562 (0.1308)
cyclical unempl. rate in t ∗∗0.2527 (0.0417) ∗∗0.2164 (0.0397)
unempl. status in 1992 ∗∗0.9537 (0.0916) ∗∗0.9812 (0.0920)
avg. age 0.0599 (0.0599) 0.0581 (0.0597)
avg. agesq. -0.0008 (0.0007) -0.0008 (0.0007)
avg. university degree ∗∗-0.4463 (0.0932) ∗∗-0.4518 (0.0931)
avg. high sch./apprenticeship ∗-0.1757 (0.0808) ∗-0.1785 (0.0807)
avg. married -0.2133 (0.1504) -0.2176 (0.1502)
avg. children in hh 0.0923 (0.1206) 0.0949 (0.1203)
avg. disability 0.0177 (0.1181) 0.0153 (0.1179)
avg. non-EU nationality ∗∗0.3796 (0.0863) ∗∗0.3790 (0.0862)
avg. North 0.1103 (0.0963) 0.1167 (0.0959)
avg. West ∗∗0.2441 (0.0776) ∗∗0.2437 (0.0776)
avg. Middle ∗∗0.2758 (0.0887) ∗∗0.2753 (0.0886)
avg. Berlin ∗∗0.5272 (0.1266) ∗∗0.5323 (0.1263)
avg. East ∗∗0.5900 (0.0779) ∗∗0.5992 (0.0776)
constant ∗-1.4096 (0.6684) ∗-1.4238 (0.6670)
σa ∗∗0.6275 (0.0241) ∗∗0.6272 (0.0241)
ρ ∗∗0.2825 (0. 0155) ∗∗0. 2823 (0.0156)
∗= significant at 5%-level, ∗∗= significant at 1%-level
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Appendix
Figure A1: Unemployment rate and linear time trend, West German states
(SH = Schleswig Holstein, HAM = Hamburg, LSAX = Lower Saxony, BRE = Bremen,
NRW = North Rhine-Westfalia, HES = Hesse, PS = Rhineland Palatinate and Saarland,
R BW = Baden Wu¨rttemberg, BAV = Bavaria)
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Figure A2: Unemployment rate and linear time trend, East German states
(MWP = Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, BRA = Brandenburg, SAN = Saxony-Anhalt,
THU = Thuringia, SAX = Saxony)
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